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Analysis Of Section 230 Under a Theory of 
Premises Liability: A Focus on Herrick v. 
Grindr and Daniel v. Armslist 
Kassandra C. Cabrera 
Abstract 
been held to give online service providers acting as interactive 
computer services sweeping immunity for content posted on their 
platforms. The intention behind the creation of Section 230 was 
not to immunize online service providers from all liability. Rather, 
Section 230 was enacted to protect online intermediaries acting 
restrict unlawful or harmful content, but due to the breadth of the 
internet and advancements in technology over or under-filtered 
content on their platforms. This note outlines an approach for 
courts to hold online service providers liable for the foreseeable 
consequences of harmful content on their platforms. Under a 
theory of premises liability, online service providers can be held 
liable for the foreseeable consequences of dangerous, harmful, or 
illegal content made by third parties and allowed on their 
platforms. In other words, like physical landowners or business 
operators, online service providers should have a duty to maintain 
their websites in a reasonably safe condition and to protect 
against, and remedy, harmful third-party content by making 
 Generally, the owners 
of physical locations open to the public have a duty to make 
reasonable efforts to protect people against foreseeable harm 
caused by the acts of third parties that they know, or should know 
about, and that are likely to occur without such efforts. That same 
duty should be extended to the online context. By extending a duty 
similar to that required in the theory of premises liability, online 
platforms will be incentivized to implement measures to prevent 
future damage and rectify any potentially dangerous conditions 
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present once having been informed of such. Only when online 
should they be given immunity under Section 230. Thus, applying 
the theory of premises liability to the online context would serve 
the purpose of Section 230 better than the status quo. Specifically, 
this note applies the theory of online premises liability by applying 
it to two cases that were submitted to the United States Supreme 
Court for review this term Herrick v. Grindr (review denied on 
October 7, 2019) and Daniel v. Armslist (review denied on 
November 25, 2019). This analysis will demonstrate how the 
imposition of a duty similar to that of premises liability will 
incentivize online operators to implement measures to prevent 
against foreseeable harm. 
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In the last twenty years, the Internet has grown to become home to 
over 1.75 billion websites.1 Internet activity is dominated by multi-billion-
dollar companies that profit from content posted by third parties these 
include, but are not limited to, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Craigslist. In 1996, prior to the immense and unimaginable expansion of 
the Internet, Congress passed Section 230 of the Communications 
2 Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron 
 
1 Total Number of Websites, internet live stats (retrieved on February 21, 2020), 
https://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/. 
2 47 U.S.C. § 230 ( Communications Decency Act  or CDA ). 
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Wyden, the drafters of Section 230, propelled it through Congress with the 
intent of establishing the foundation for a safe and free Internet.3 
4 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA 
states, 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content 
5 
According to Section 230(c)(2), 
shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected . . . . 6 
Section 230 distinguishes interactive computer services from online 
content providers.7 An online content provider is one who creates 
content for example, by making a statement8 while an interactive 
computer service provides the means to do so. Many interactive service 
providers not only provide a platform for content but also promote, sort, 
and shape third-party posts. An interactive computer service, like 
Facebook or YouTube, acts as a host for content, while online content 
providers develop or contribute content.9 In the Electronic Frontier 
intermediaries that host or republish speech are protected against a range 
 
3 See Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet a Better Place. It 
Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-was-supposed-to-
make-the-internet-a-better-place-it-failed. 
4 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
5 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
6 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
7 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(2)-(3). 
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
9 See Jeff Kosseff, What s in a Name? Quite a Bit, If You re Talking About Section 230, 
LAWFARE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-name-quite-bit-if-youre-
talking-about-section-230 ( [Section 230] provides online platforms such as websites and 
social media services with broad protection from liability arising from many types of user-
generated content. ). 
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of laws that might otherwise be used to hold them legally responsible for 
10 
The idea behind Section 230 was to provide online service providers 
harmful content posted by third parties on their platforms.11 After 
diligently researching the history of Section 230 for over two years for his 
book The Twenty-Six Words That Created the Internet, Jeff Kosseff found 
platforms rather than the government to develop the rules of the road 
for t 12 Section 230 was intended to serve 
dual purposes: (c)(1) was designed to remove the burden of treating online 
13 Despite this, most online platforms 
have failed to adequately moderate, or moderate content at all. As a result, 
multi-billion-dollar internet companies have been granted immunity for 
allowing, or even promoting, content that severely negatively affects their 
users, and others, often by ignoring easily implementable protective and 
remedial moderation measures.14 
By contrast, brick and mortar businesses have been held to share 
liability for the harmful conduct caused by third parties in their physical 
operating locations. The concept of collective responsibility considers 
those exercising control over a particular space, like a business operator or 
15 For example, a hotel can be sued for a shooting by a 
 
10 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 
(last visited on Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230. 
11 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)-(2). 
12 Kosseff, supra note 9. 
13 See § 230(c)(1); see § 230(c)(2); Section 230 Workshop Nurturing Innovation or 
Fostering Unaccountability?, THE U.S. DEP T. OF JUST. (Feb. 19, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/video/section-230-workshop-nurturing-innovation-or-
fostering-unaccountability (referring to Mary Anne Franks at 2:16:40) (stating that (c)(2) 
protects Good Samaritans  but what it offers is taken away by (c)(1) which has been held 
to mean that platforms will not be held accountable even if they don t). 
14 See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn t Just Backpage: 
Revising 
Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. L. REV. 453, 466 (2018) (providing a list of entities 
that 
are immunized from liability  under a general reading of Section 230). 
15 Mary Anne Franks, Our Collective Responsibility for Mass Shootings, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/mass-shooting-
responsibility.html ( The MGM settlement illustrates the principle of collective 
responsibility, under which third parties can be considered responsible for harmful acts 
they did not cause but did not do enough to prevent . . . .Such entities are often said to have 
breached a duty of care,  and imposing liability is intended to give them incentive to be 
more careful in the future. ). 
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third-party that occurred on its premises;16 a motel can be sued for the rape 
and murder of a woman committed by a third-party;17 and a store can be 
sued for failing to rectify a dangerous condition caused by a third party.18 
These brick and mortar businesses have been held collectively responsible 
for failing to protect against dangerous conditions that were reasonably 
likely to result in harm or for failing to respond adequately to remedy 
potentially dangerous conditions they knew or should have known would 
result in harm.19 Online service providers, by contrast, have not been found 
to be collectively responsible for harmful content allowed or facilitated by 
their platforms. 
Online service providers against which many brick and mortar 
businesses continue to compete have swaddled themselves and their 
wrongdoing in the blanket immunity granted to them by courts around the 
country through Section 230. Despite the differences between virtual and 
physical spaces, a duty analogous to that in premises liability which 
would require interactive computer services to maintain their online 
efforts should be extended to the online context.20 While premises 
liability cannot be extended literally to the online context, many of its 
principles like that of foreseeability of harm, specifically can be 
meaningfully applied. 
business owners establish, control, and benefit from their businesses. 
Website operators are proprietors who exercise control over their business 
21 Website operators are in the best position to protect their 
users and have the resources to do so. 
 
16 See Marco della Cava, This is mercy, not justice : Las Vegas Shooting Victims to 
Split $800M. But How Much is Pain Worth?, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/12/06/las-vegas-shooting-victims-
split-mgm-settlement-judges-decide/2601704001/. 
17 David J. Neal and Johanna Alvarez, She Spent Her Last Night at a Motel. The Motel 
Owes her Mother and Father $12 Million., MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/hialeah/article188070239.html. 
18 Joe Marusak, Woman Sues Walmart After Slipping on Blueberries, Causing 
Unbearable Pain , THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article230957738.html. 
19 Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 6 Cal. 4th 666, 674 (1993) (stating that premises 
liability is a subcategory of negligence torts, where a plaintiff claims that the defendant 
failed to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. ). 
20 See Nancy S. Kim, Website Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. 
REV. 993, 1034 (2009) ( [T]he analogy to premises liability is not a perfect one given the 
differences between the Internet and the physical world, including the inability to draw 
secure boundaries and screen for potential harm. ). 
21 Id. 
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Although Section 230 was designed with a focus on preserving the 
First Amendment,22 much of what Section 230 has been found to protect 
transcends speech and crosses into the realm of conduct.23 This is a point 
emphasized by Carrie Goldberg, the attorney for the Plaintiff in Herrick v. 
Grindr. At a Department of Justice Workshop regarding Section 230 on 
February 19, 2020, Goldberg spoke of how much of the litigation 
surrounding Section 230 including that which occurred in the case of her 
client is not about words, but actions.24 
centuries of tort law that empowers an individual to 
get justice when they are being harmed . . . And when a 
platform . . . basically hides behind Section 230 as the 
an access to justice issue. T
a lot of these lawsuits have to do with conduct, not 
content. Let Section 230 exist and regulate content. 
People should be able to call one another the b-word on 
twitter without being sued . . 25 
A longstanding exception to First Amendment protection is speech 
26 For example, the 
possessing child pornography, [ ] soliciting crime, and [ ] announcing 
27 Furthermore, in United States v. Osinger, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Federal Cyberstalking statute 
because it prohibited harassing and intimidating conduct, not speech 
protected by the First Amendment.28 Thus, the fact that an act involves 
speech does not mean that it cannot also constitute conduct.29 The 
 
22 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and 
Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, UNIV. CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 6 
(forthcoming 2020). 
23 Id. ( Immunizing from liability enterprises that have nothing to do with moderating 
online speech, such as marketplaces that connect sellers of deadly weapons with prohibited 
buyers for a cut of the profit, is unjustifiable. ). 
24 THE UNITED STATED DEP T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 13 (referring to Carrie Goldberg). 
25 Id. (referring to Carrie Goldberg at 1:26:20). 
26 Eugene Volokh, Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 983 
(2016) (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion); 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011); Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 n.5 (2010); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 69 (2010); 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008); Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 62 
(2006)). 
27 Volokh, supra note 26; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 62 (1982); 
Williams, 553 U.S. at 297; Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62. 
28 See United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014). 
29 See United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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summaries of Herrick v. Grindr and Daniel v. Armslist provided in Part 
IV of this note further illustrate this point. 
What is more, if the underlying purpose of Section 230 was to promote 
speech, failing to address online abuse significantly hinders that goal. 
Victims of online abuse have a higher tendency to suppress their speech 
than others.30 Such self-censorship diminishes the marketplace of ideas, 
which undermines a fundamental goal of the First Amendment.31 
Applying premises liability which originated in common law and 
has been imposed on the owners of physical spaces for decades32 to 
online service providers essentially means holding them liable for the 
dangerous conduct allowed, or inadequately addressed, on their 
platforms.33 This theory focuses on foreseeable consequences.34 Typically, 
land operators, businesses or owners, are held responsible for failing to 
implement reasonable precautions for, or failing to reasonably respond to, 
dangerous third-party conduct or conditions that can foreseeably result in 
harm.35 There are exceptions under this theory for holding landowners or 
operators liable for open and obvious dangerous conditions36 and for harm 
which they lacked actual or constructive knowledge of.37 Thus, to 
successfully sue under a theory of premises liability, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant breached its duty by failing to take 
reasonable precautions against potentially dangerous or harmful 
conditions it knew or should have known about, and which was not openly 
obvious to the plaintiff so that he or she could avoid it.38 
Online service providers should be extended a duty to take reasonable 
precautions to protect against foreseeable consequences of dangerous 
third-party content. Today, numerous courts across the country have 
extended immunity to online service providers who have done close to 
nothing, or nothing at all, to protect against ongoing or potential future 
harm, regardless of whether they are being treated as publishers. As a 
 
30 Citron & Franks, supra note 22 at 9 (citing to Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: 
Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 125-26 (2016)). 
31 See id. at 9-10. 
32 See Robert S. Driscoll, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its Past, Present, 
and Some Considerations for its Future, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 881, 881 (2013) 
(describing the change in standard from the landmark decision of Rowland v. Christian, 
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)). 
33 See, e.g., Martin v. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., 80 A.3d 813, 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2013) ( [P]ossessors of land who hold it open to the public . . . owe a duty to any business 
invitee . . . to take reasonable precaution against harmful third-party conduct that might be 
reasonably anticipated. ). 
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
35 See Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., 80 A.3d at 815 (2013). 
36 See Richard v. Meijer, No.342766, 2019 WL 1780670 (Apr. 23, 2019). 
37 See Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 943 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2019). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
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result, online service providers are not incentivized to discover and 
implement reasonable precautions because they are guaranteed immunity 
regardless of what measures, or lack thereof, that they choose to 
implement, and whether or not they are being treated as publishers. Users, 
and others in the community, suffer the consequences of dangerous third-
party conduct that is facilitated by these online platforms.39 Therefore, 
s preemptive immunity should be granted only when the 
online service provider is actually being treated as a publisher, otherwise 
the online service provider should be extended a duty of care. 
The concept of willful ignorance which is used in determining 
criminal culpability allows a defendant to be found guilty of a crime 
requiring knowledge because the defendant willfully ignored the facts.40 
Under the theory of premises liability, a defendant can be found to be 
liable for negligently maintaining his property when there is a reasonable 
likelihood of harm that is foreseeable, even if the defendant chooses to 
ignore the foreseeability of that harm. Additionally, the concept of willful 
41 Proof 
of foreseeability for negligence does not require a showing of actual 
knowledge, but only that the defendant knew or should have known.42 
By extending a duty of care to online service providers, courts would 
incentivize the platforms to make risk assessments and engage in cost 
benefit analyses to determine which safety features to implement.43  Thus, 
rather than granting all online service providers immunity, courts would 
only give immunity in cases where online service providers are treated as 
publishers, as per the language of Section 230. Further, Courts would only 
efforts to moderate content to protect users from foreseeably dangerous 
third-party content. 
 
39 Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts: Zeran s  Legacy, THE RECORDER (Nov. 
10, 2017), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-
on-stilts-zerans-legacy/ ( Today, the Internet is awash in threats, harassment, defamation, 
revenge porn, propaganda, misinformation, and conspiracy theories, which 
disproportionately burden vulnerable private citizens including women, racial and religious 
minorities, and the LGBT community. They are the ones who suffer while the websites, 
platforms, and ISPs that make it possible for these abuses to flourish are protected from 
harm. ). 
40 See Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 UNIV. COL. L. REV. 97, 101 
(2017). 
41 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
43 See Prepared Written Testimony and Statement for the Record For Hearing on 
Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers Before the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 116th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2019) (statement of Danielle Keats Citron, Professor of 
Law, Boston University School of Law) ( Congress wanted to incentivize private efforts 
to filter, block, or otherwise address troubling online activity. ) 
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It is important to note that this does not mean that online service 
providers must protect against all dangerous third-party content and 
conduct. This simply means that online service providers will not be given 
the immunity shield unless they have used their sword by acting within 
their power to reasonably protect against and rectify dangerous 
conditions.44 By analyzing cases of online harms through a premises 
liability lens, courts can better serve the purpose of Section 230 by 
incentivizing online service providers to make good faith efforts to protect 
Internet users against foreseeable harm.45 Otherwise, these multi-million 
and billion-dollar online service providers will continue to operate 
unscathed despite their flagrant disregard for user safety, and public safety 
generally. 
Part II explains the intent and purpose of Section 230 by looking at the 
statu
describes the theory of premises liability, focusing on various approaches 
courts have taken in applying it and identifying the best approach for the 
online context. Part IV explains how the theory of premises liability could 
successfully be used by courts to apply Section 230 in a way that 
moderation and adhere to principles applied to physical spaces, focusing 
on extending a duty to online service providers and examining causation 
requirements. Specifically, this note will apply premises liability concepts 
to the cases of Herrick v. Grindr and Daniel v. Armslist in a way that 
vizing online service providers to 
. 
In Grindr, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Southern 
liability despite having substantial knowledge of dangerous conditions and 
failing to take reasonable measures, or any measures for that matter, to 
prevent negative consequences. Unlike in Herrick, the appellate court in 
Daniel v. Armslist declined to find that Section 230 immunized Armslist 
from liability. The court found that the plaintiff was not attempting to treat 
 
44 Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet a Better Place. It 
Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-was-supposed-to-
make-the-internet-a-better-place-it-failed (quoting Representative Wyden stating, There 
was a shield, and there was a sword. The sword was the legal authority of the website 
owner to moderate content. It s clear to me looking at the evolution of time that too many 
sites particularly the big companies as they got so prosperous enjoyed the shield, but 
weren t willing to use the sword. ). 
45 See Danielle Keats Citron, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans 
Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 416 (2017) ( [The current] interpretation 
undermines the congressional goal of incentivizing self-regulation. ). 
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Armslist as a publisher of third-party content, which would contravene 
Section 230 (c)(1), but instead sought to hold Armslist liable for its 
negligent conduct in the creation and operation of its own platform. As a 
result, Armslist was not able to dismiss the case on Section 230 grounds. 
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed this ruling and, like the 
New York court in Grindr, found that 230 immunity did in fact apply. The 
U.S. Supreme Court denied review in Herrick v. Grindr on October 7, 
2019 and Daniel v. Armslist, on November 25, 2019, leaving the prior 
decisions in place. 
The outcomes in these two cases are hard to imagine in the physical 
world.46 
wrongdoing can be held accountable for that failure. It is no less important 
that this duty to take care be honor 47 However, courts 
have abandoned classical tort theories in deciding cases occurring in 
virtual spaces.48 Courts should apply the tort theory of premises liability 
to the online context so that immunity for online service providers exists 
only for platforms that have taken reasonable measures to protect from 
dangerous conditions or prevent harm of which they know, or should 
know, is reasonably likely to occur. 
Recently, Congress has debated the language and application of 
Section 230, and some members have even discussed repealing it.49 
Although Section 230 has in fact resulted in unacceptable consequences, 
we must not forget its positive effect on the creation of the expansive 
Internet we have today.50  need to choose 
between the status quo and an all-out repeal of Section 230, however. 
Instead, platforms should immediately revamp their content moderation 
policies and procedures, as some are now starting to do, beginning with 
more moderators and better a 51 However, it is up to 
the courts to hold these online service providers liable for failing to take 
52 as Kosseff suggests. 
 
46 See Franks, supra note 15 (stating that MGM s attempt to avoid liability for failing to 
secure its premises was met with outrage by the general public). 
47 Id. 
48 See THE UNITED STATED DEP T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 13 (referring to Carrie 
Goldberg at 1:26:20). 
49 See Press Release, Dep t of Justice to Hold Workshop on Section 230 of the 
Commc ns Decency Act (Jan. 30, 2020). 
50 Jeff Kosseff, Op-Ed: Section 230 created the Internet as we know it. Don t mess with 
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II. SECTION S HISTORY AND JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Section 230 regulates the liability of website operators such as social 
media platforms and online marketplaces for user-generated content. The 
history that led to the passage of Section 230 indicates that the provision 
service providers.53 By extending practically absolute immunity to online 
service providers, courts have precluded incentivizing online service 
providers to adopt reasonable protective measures.54 Furthermore, the 
outcomes in cases concerning liability, or lack thereof, of online service 
providers, would be considered unacceptable if their origin were in a 
physical rather than virtual space. Analyzing cases involving Section 230 
under a theory of premises liability a theory that has historically be 
applied in physical spaces endorses the implementation of practices that 
will lead to a safer internet. 
The story of Section 230 in many ways begins with the cases of Cubby, 
Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co. 
In Compuserve, the defendant hosted 
55 Subscribers had access to tons of 
information as well as access to online forums, one of which was the 
Journalism Forum.56 
newsletter available as part of the Journalism Forum.57 The plaintiffs 
58 and argued 
that Compuserve was the carrier of these statements.59 The District Court 
could demonstrate that it knew or should have known of the statements 
defamatory nature, and there was no evidence of such.60 Compuserve 
chose not to review Rumorville
control.61 Thus, Compuserve was found to be immune from liability 
 
53 See Citron & Wittes, supra note 14 at 461 ( Section 230 was by no means meant to 
immunize services whose business is the active subversion of online decency businesses 
that are not merely failing to take steps to protect users from online indecency but are 
actually facilitating and encouraging online illegality. ). 
54 Id. at 465 ( The broad sweeping interpretation of Section 230 s immunity eliminates 
incentives for better behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm. ). 
55 Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 137 (S.D. N.Y. 1991). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 138. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 141. 
61 Id. 
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because it did not know about the nature of the statements and had not 
62 
Contrarily, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Prodigy 
operated an online message board that employed editors for the content 
posted on these message boards.63 One message board post by a third-party 
allegedly defamed Stratton Oakmont, which then sued Prodigy for failing 
to fully moderate the content posted on its message board.64 Despite 
having approximately 60,000 postings a day, a number difficult to 
moderate, the court found that because Prodigy moderated some of the 
content posted on its message board it could be held liable for harmful 
content it did not remove.65 Essentially
together and simply act as a blind host . . . 66 
 Prodigy, Representatives 
Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden proposed an amendment to the CDA. It 
is important to note that in 1996, the year the amendment was passed, the 
Internet was not, nor was it likely ever imagined to become, what it has 
grown into today.67 
purpose of [Section 230] was to help clean up the Internet, not to facilitate 
68 The policy, as stated by the 
Section 230. As per Section 230, the statute was designed in part to 
promote free market ideals and development of the Internet while 
enforcing federal criminal laws by deterring and punishing unlawful 
activity in the online context.69 -Wyden Amendment, codified in 
 
62 Id. 
63 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
County 1995). 
64 Id. 
65 CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited on Nov. 1, 2019) 
(referring to Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
County 1995). 
66 Id. 
67 Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230 s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challenge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties. 
68 Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google Is About to 
Change, NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section-230-a-
key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change (Mar. 21, 2018 5:11 am EDT). 
69 47 U.S.C. § 230(b); see Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and 
Misconceptions About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2014) ( The other, 
often overlooked goals of §230 include the development of technologies that maximize 
user control over what information is received  by Internet users, as well as the vigorous 
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Section 230, provid
online service providers that either over- or under-filtered objectionable 
70 
considered to be reasonable but ultimately come up short or go too far, 
incentivize not penalize private efforts to filter, block, or otherwise 
71 Section 230 protection was created to protect 
efforts to protect against dangerous 
content. 
A year after the passing of Section 230, the case of Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc. 72 set the stage for application of the statute. Zeran, 
the plaintiff, sued AOL, arguing that it was negligent in failing to remove 
defamatory postings made by a third party.73 In particular, Zeran argued 
that Section 230 allowed for liability for interactive computer services, like 
AOL, when they have notice of the defamatory postings distributed on 
their platforms.74 The cour
it would discourage online service providers from 
monitoring content, and thus, would be contrary to the purpose of Section 
230.75 
suggested that online intermediaries were already insufficiently motivated 
76 That is, if the goal was to incentivize 
reasonable moderation practices, granting near-absolute immunity proved 
to do the opposite. 
Zeran illustrates how Section 230 has not incentivized platforms to act 
bystander-like conduct. Extending a duty, like that under a theory of 
premises liability, would motivate online service providers to address 
dangerous conditions present on their platforms. Instead, however, courts 
have interpreted Section 230(c)(1) as granting online service providers 
unfettered immunity from liability for content posted on their platforms by 
third parties regardless of whether they were acting as what has been 
 
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking 
and harassment by means of computer.  In other words, the law is intended to promote 
and protect the values of privacy, security and liberty alongside the values of open 
discourse. ). 
70 Citron, supra note 67. 
71 Citron & Franks, supra note 22 at 2. 
72 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
73 Id. at 328. 
74 Id. at 331. 
75 Franks, supra note 39. 
76 Id. 
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traditionally defined as a publisher.77 
from liability to platforms that republished content knowing it violated the 
law; solicited illegal content while ensuring that those responsible could 
not be identified; altered their user interface to ensure that criminals could 
78 
However, a small minority of courts have denied Section 230 
immunity to online intermediaries whose design features themselves have 
encouraged or facilitated illegal or unlawful content. The Roommates.com 
case is particularly worth noting because it is one of the few cases where 
a court has found that an online service provider cannot claim immunity 
under Section 230.79 
to hold that Roommates.com was not entitled to Section 230 immunity for 
the operation of its system. Specifically, the court found that 
and personal characteristics that Roommate itself forces subscribers to 
80 In its creation of such a system, Roommates.com acted as a 
content developer, not merely a publisher of third-party content, and was 
not immune under Section 230.81 
cases. In Roommates.com, the court distinguished features that could or 
could not be found to impose liability: 
If an individual uses an ordinary search engine to query 
contributed to any alleged unlawfulness in the 
 
77 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162-
63. ( A website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider: If it 
passively displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service 
provider with respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is 
responsible, in whole or in part  for creating or developing, the website is also a content 
provider. Thus, a website may be immune from liability for some of the content it displays 
to the public but be subject to liability for other content. ). 
78 Citron, supra note 71; see Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, 17 N.Y.3d 
281, 284-85 (N.Y. App Ct. 2011); Phan v. Pham, 182 Cal.App.4th 323, 325-26 (Cal. App. 
Ct. 2010); Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 401-02 
(6th Cir. 2014); -CV-00392, 2012 WL 3335284, at *2 
(W.D. Mo. March 12, 2012); see, e.g., Hinton v. Amazon, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 
(S.D. Miss. 2014). 
79 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1175; see Barnes v. 
Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009); F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1201 (10th Cir. 2009); see also J.S. v. Village Media Holdings, LLC, 184 Wash.2d 95, 
101-02 (Wash. S. Ct. 2015). 
80 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
81 Id. at 1174. 
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what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount 
exception.82 
83 whether the 
interactive computer service has created features that promote or openly 
allow misconduct, or whether the service pr
simply being used for wrongdoing.84 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
children . . s created by Roommates.com.85 Contrarily, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Section 230 immunity applied to the free form 
preferences or whatever else they may want, without any choice given by 
publication.86 
used to distinguish when an online entity is acting as an interactive 
computer service or an information content provider.87 Applying the 
theory of premises liability, the Court would have concluded that 
Roommates.com was not immune from liability because it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the drop-
would be used for discriminatory purposes.  This analysis would have set 
a standard for future online liability cases: Online operators must 
implement reasonable content moderation practices in light of foreseeable 
harm to be extended Section 230 immunity. Unfortunately, this was not 
 
For example, in Doe IX v. Myspace, Inc., plaintiff argued under the 
same theory used in Roommates.com 
information content provider because it developed the information on the 
 
82 Id. at 1169. 
83 42 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
84 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1171 (citing to Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), stating that there, the website 
provided neutral tools which the anonymous user used to publish libel, but the website did 
nothing to encourage, thus, the website operator could not be held liable). 
85 Id. at 1165. 
86 Id. at 1166. 
87 See id. at 1169 (emphasizing that neutral tools do not contribute to the unlawfulness 
of the third-party s conduct for example, here, a blank space allowing users to input 
specific information that may be discriminatory but does not contribute to that, while on 
the other hand the drop-down menu, which specified discriminatory criteria for a 
roommate, did contribute to the unlawfulness of the conduct). 
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88 The court found that 
Roommates.com was distinguishable because it required users to provide 
specific information, while Myspace merely allowed for additional 
information to be added.89 Furthermore, in Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings, LLC, immunity was once again extended to a 
defendant whose website was created for the primary purpose of posting 
gossip about public figures.90 TheDirty would select and publish user 
submissions with small blurbs describing the content.91 Despite this, the 
court found that the defendant did not create content and therefore, was 
immune from liability.92 
However, in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. (d/b/a ModelMayhem.com) 
(herei
failure to warn claim.93 The plaintiff, an amateur model, used Model 
Mayhem, a networking site for people in the modeling industry, where she 
was lured to a fake audition, drugged, raped, and recorded for a 
pornographic video.94 She alleged that Model Mayhem knew of the rape 
scheme, because the individuals involved had been criminally charged, 
and should thus be responsible for failing to warn her of the danger.95 The 
old Internet Brands liable as the 
96 Instead, the plaintiff sought to hold Model Mayhem 
liable for failure to warn she was not seeking to hold Model Mayhem 
liable for the conduct of third-parties but for its lack of response to that 
conduct. Likewise, under a theory of premises liability, the plaintiffs 
would not seek hold online intermediaries liable under traditional 
publisher liability, but seek to hold them liable for their failure to exercise 
to mean those that are reasonable in light of the foreseeable harm. 
Another approach was that taken by the court in Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com LLC , where the plaintiffs sued Backpage, 
claiming that as minors they were victims of sex-trafficking via the 
 
88 Doe IX v. Myspace, Inc., 629 F.Supp.2d 663, 665 (Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. 2009). 
89 Id. at 665. 
90 Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
91 Id. at 401. 
92 Id. 
93 Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). 
94 Id. at 848. 
95 Id. at 849. 
96 Id. at 851. 
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97 The plaintiffs alleged that Backpage facilitated sex-
trafficking by third-party users.98 Further, the plaintiffs argued that 
Backpage deliberately created its website to encourage sex trafficking, or 
at a minimum make it easier. Specifically, although Backpage filtered out 
some prohibited terms, it did not filter out known substitutes for 
99 Through 
its allowance of anonymity, code terminology used to refer to sexual 
services by underage girls, and altered telephone numbers, Backpage was 
a hub for sex trafficking. Despite these facts, the court found that Section 
230 immunity was to be applied broadly and extended to Backpage.100 
Following Backpage.com, President Donald Trump signed into law a 
-Traffi
Enabling Sex- together known as FOSTA-
SESTA.101 The bills created an exception to Section 230, making websites 
prostitution of another person . . . 102 
103 and were specifically 
intended to combat the kind of sex-trafficking activity taking place on 
Backpage.104 It is important to note that sex trafficking, as a violation of 
federal criminal law, was already an exception to Section 230 immunity.105 
But FOSTA-
that host sex-trafficking ads and enables victims and state attorneys 
general to fil 106 
Although the passing of the bills was seemingly a win for society, this 
piecemeal approach is unlikely to be successful in the long run. Immunity 
for online actors affects plaintiffs in several contexts including, but not 
 
97 See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016). 
98 Id. at 19. 
99 Id. at 16-17. 
100 Id. at 19. 
101 Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of 
the Internet as we Know It, VOX, (Jul. 2, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-
freedom. 
102 Id. (quoting H.R. 1865 - Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act of 2017). 
103 Jennifer Huddleston Skees, A Cautionary Tale on Internet Freedom Carve-Outs, THE 
HILL (Jan. 17, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/425768-a-cautionary-tale-on-
internet-freedom-carve-outs. 
104 Romano, supra note 101. 
105 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2018). 
106 Tom Jackman, Trump Signs FOSTA  Bill Targeting Online Sex Trafficking, Enables 
States and Victims to Pursue Websites, WASHINGTON POST (April 11, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/11/trump-signs-fosta-bill-
targeting-online-sex-trafficking-enables-states-and-victims-to-pursue-websites/. 
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defamation, discrimination, harassment, fraud and misrepresentation in 
online dating, and illegal transactions of firearms.107 Therefore, addressing 
Section 230 immunity one context at a time would prolong the fight and 
result in the continuous posting of dangerous content online, which as 
can be seen from the abundance of case law surrounding Section 230 
immunity has resulted in devastating consequences for plaintiffs and 
users generally. The growth of the Internet makes it almost impossible to 
reliably predict new contexts where Section 230 may arise and result in 
harmful consequences in the future. Contrarily, under the theory of 
premises liability, by extending a duty of care to online service providers, 
courts could reach outcomes that adhere to the goal of Section 230 to 
incentivize online service providers, abide by classical tort principles long 
accepted in physical spaces, and set precedent for future cases.108 
III. PREMISES LIABILITY 
Premises liability is a type of negligence claim where a plaintiff 
109 For a plaintiff to successfully sue under the theory of 
premises liability, he or she must typically demonstrate (1) that he or she 
was legally present on the land, meaning that he or she was not trespassing; 
and (2) that the defendant had a duty to protect against his or her injuries 
or damages (a) because the defendant knew or should have known that 
there was a dangerous condition and (b) should have expected that the 
plaintiff would fail to protect against said condition.110 The plaintiff must 
also demonstrate that the defenda his or her failure to 
 
107 See Zak Franklin, Justice for Revenge Porn Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome 
Claims of Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 102 CAL. L. REV. 5 
(2014); see Cohen v. Facebook, 252 F. Supp.3d 140, 146-47 (Dist. Ct. E.D. N.Y. 2017); 
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 401-02 (8th Cir. 
2014); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008).; Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F.Supp.3d 579, 584 (S.D. N.Y. 
2018); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis.2d 449, 457 (Wis. 2019). 
108 See Kim, supra note 20 at 1012 ( Online harassment can be combatted by changing 
the roles the Web site sponsors currently play and by imposing tort liability on those who 
fail to meet certain expectations. Web site sponsors maintain a proprietary interest in their 
Web sites, and we should expect them to conform to the standard of conduct expected of 
other proprietors. ) 
109 Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 6 Cal. 4th 666, 674 (stating that under a theory of 
premises liability, a plaintiff alleges that a defendant did not [m]aintain land in their 
possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. ). 
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
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exercise reasonable care was the cause of his or her injuries.111 
Typically, the determination of whether a duty exists turns on the 
foreseeability of the danger.112 Under this theory, a duty to take reasonable 
precautionary or protective measures has been found to extend to land 
operators that open their premises up to the public, even for conduct 
committed by third parties.113 
A. History of Premises Liability 
Under the common law system, premises liability cases turned on the 
114 A landowner owes the highest 
duty of care to invitees.115 
by the landowner, whether implicitly or explicitly, the landowner has a 
116 This duty to invitees required 
landowners to warn them of potentially dangerous conditions and protect 
against dangers the owner knows or has reason to know may result in 
harm.117 The s
who is privileged to enter or remain on the land only by virtue of the 
118 Essentially, the duty a landowner owes to 
licensees is that of reasonable care for dangers the individual is unlikely 
to know about and protect against.119  The last category is that of a 
possession of another without a privilege to do so . . . 120 Typically, 
landowners have no affirmative duty to protect trespassers.121 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the importance of these 
categories for visitors diminished.122 In Rowland v. Christian, the 




112 See Wylie Clarkson, Premises Liability in South Carolina: Should You Expect 
Criminal Activity On Your Property?, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 619 (2009); W. 
Marshall Sanders, Between Bystander and Insurer: Locating the Duty of Georgia 
Landowner to Safeguard Against Third-Party Criminal Attacks on the Premises, 15 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (1999). 
113 See Martin v. Rite Aid of Pa, Inc., 80 A.3d 813, 815 (2013) ( [P]ossessors of land 
who hold it open to the public . . . owe a duty to any business invitee . . . to take reasonable 
precaution against harmful third-party conduct that might be reasonably anticipated. ). 





119 Id. at 884. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 885. 
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trespasser would be only one factor in the liability inquiry and no longer 
123 Numerous state courts followed the decision to 
abandon the categorical approach to premises liability following 
Rowland.124 While many jurisdictions have abandoned the approach 
completely, a near majority continue to use it.125 Some other jurisdictions 
have decided to keep the trespasser category but merge the licensee and 
invitee categories.126 
The law of premises liability remains unsettled and depends on the 
jurisdiction.127 Nonetheless, core concepts of premises liability can be 
applicable to virtual spaces as well as physical spaces. Typically, website 
128 
Thus, users can be categorized as invitees. Even if users are not found to 
be invitees, they cannot be categorized as trespassers because website 
operators generally either open their platforms up to the public or consent 
to users being present on their websites by requiring the creation of an 
account, for example. Despite the fact that websites are not physical 
property, the domains are owned and operated in similar ways to physical 
property. As such, the theory of premises liability is applicable to virtual 
spaces owned and operated by online intermediaries. Part IV of this note 
 
B. Premises Liability and Third-Party Criminal Acts 
Of specific importance in applying the theory of premises liability to 
the online context is the imposition of liability on landowners for harms 
caused by the unlawful acts of third parties. Historically, courts were 
disinclined to impose a duty on landowners to protect against third-party 
conduct because of difficulty in finding proximate causation.129 However, 
the duty under the theory of premises liability extends to landowners when 
the potential harm from third-party conduct is reasonably foreseeable.130 
 
123 Id. at 887 (citing to Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)). 
124 Id. at 888. 
125 Id. at 890 ( A near majority of states have actually rejected a unitary standard and still 
apply the tripartite system ). 
126 Id. ( Further, many state courts have preserved the trespasser distinction while 
merging licensee and invitee into one category ). 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 883. 
129 W. Marshall Sanders, Between Bystander and Insurer: Locating the Duty of Georgia 
Landowner to Safeguard Against Third-Party Criminal Attacks on the Premises, 15 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1999). 
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f. (1965) ( If the place or character of 
his business, or his past experience, is such that [a possessor of land] should reasonably 
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In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., the court 
extended liability to the landowner of an apartment building for the 
injuries the plaintiff sustained after being assaulted and robbed in the 
apartment complex hallway.131 The court reasoned that the landowner had 
ssess[ed] both superior 
132 
es unguarded.133 Likewise, in the online context, 
interactive computer service providers possess the knowledge and 
resources to be able to protect users, and others, from crimes occurring on, 
or facilitated by their websites as is evident by the examples set forth in 
Part II and which will be further discussed in Part IV.134 
Premises liability has been successfully invoked for physical harm and 
emotional / mental harm, also known as pain and suffering.135 For 
example, tort law has been successfully invoked to compensate a witness 
of a violent act suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as, a 
plaintiff suffering from emotional distress due to harassment.136 Generally, 
they have suffered and (2) deter future negligent conduct.  Similarly, the 
tort law principles at the core of the theory of premises liability should be 
extended to the onl
protect against conduct that results in an unlawful or dangerous condition, 
that is foreseeably likely to result in harm. There are four approaches for 
determining whether harm (physical or non-physical) is foreseeable: the 
specific imminent harm approach, the prior similar incidents approach, the 
 
anticipate carless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at 
some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it . . . ). 
131 Sanders, supra note 129 at 1099. 
132 Id. at 1105. 
133 Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. App. Ct. 1970). 
134 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe IX v. Myspace, 
Inc. 629 F.Supp.2d 663, 663 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com 
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 12 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Herrick v. Grindr, LLC., 306 F.Supp.3d 
579, 579 (S.D. N.Y. 2018); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis.2d 449, 449 (Wis. 2019); 
Kim, supra note 20 at 1035 ( Web site sponsors maintain control over the content of the 
site . . . and are in the best position to prevent harm to other users on the site. ). 
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). 
136 See Greene v. Young, 113 Wash.App. 746, 748 (Wash. App. Ct. 2002); Henrickson 
v. State, 319 Mont. 307, 312, 84 P. 3d 38, 44-45 (Mont. 2004); see Blakey v. Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 731, 733-34 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1998); Coleman v. Tennessee, 998 
F.Supp. 840, 843 (Tenn. Dist. Ct. 1998). 
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totality of the circumstances approach, and the balancing approach.137 
Which approach will be used to determine foreseeable harm depends on 
the jurisdiction.138 
Under the specific imminent harm approach, the most restrictive 
to occur that poses 
139 The specific imminent harm approach 
requires that specific evidence that a particular harm was imminent and 
that the landowner knew that it was imminent.140 This approach is unlikely 
to fare well in the online context because of the specificity and imminence 
requirements. However, for example, in the case of Herrick v. Grindr, 
Herrick repeatedly reported the harassment and abuse he was experiencing 
to Grindr.141 Despite this, Grindr did absolutely nothing to rectify these 
dangerous conditions.142 As such, it could be argued that in cases where 
multiple reports are made to the online service provider, the providers 
know or have reason to know that the conduct is likely to lead to the 
specific harm complained of. 
The prior similar incidents approach requires a plaintiff show that 
143 Under this 
approach, cases are decided on a case-by-case basis144 the landowner has 
a duty to protect against and anticipate harm based on the fact that a similar 
crimes have occurred before. This approach would only hold online 
intermediaries liable after a similar crime occurred on the platform. 
However, the theory of premises liability wants to encourage online 
service providers to foresee potential consequences of the features on their 
platform and engage in reasonable content moderation practices before 
harm occurs. Additionally, this approach might not succeed in the online 
context because the breadth of the internet allows for various distinctive 
 
137 See Clarkson, supra note 112 at 619-621. 
138 See id. at 619. 
139 Id. at 621. ( In other words, the injured party is required to prove that the property 
owner knew of the specific imminent harm which was about to occur. ). 
140 Id. 
141 Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 765 F. App x 586 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. 
Aug. 7, 2019) (No. 19-192) ( Between November 2016 and January 2017, Herrick reported 
Grindr s targeting of him and his stalking approximately fifty times to Grindr. ). 
142 Id. at 10. 
143 Clarkson, supra note 112 at 621; see 1 JOHN ELLIOTT LEIGHTON, LITIGATING PREMISES 
SECURITY CASES (West ed., 6th ed. 2020) ( [T]he plaintiff needs to show that based on 
prior similar incidents, it was likely that a patron of the defendant s establishment, without 
defendant s precautions to prevent it, would be injured by the criminal act of a third 
person. ). 
144 Clarkson, supra note 112, at 622, 623. 
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crimes to be carried out in different ways so online intermediaries may 
more easily escape liability on a narrow distinction or technicality. 
of the circumstan
condition, and location of the premises, in addition to any prior similar 
incidents, and a duty can be found where no prior criminal attacks have 
145 This approach has been found to be extremely burdensome 
on businesses because it requires them to potentially protect against 
random criminal acts by others.146 
foreseeability of the harm against the burden imposed on a [landowner] by 
pr 147 In order for a duty to be extended to 
landowners, the foreseeability of the harm must outweigh the burden of 
taking precautionary or protective measures.148 This approach aims to find 
interests.149 
concept, and seeks to balance the degree of foreseeability of harm against 
the burden of duty imposed. As such, the more foreseeable a crime, the 
150 
In summary, under the theory of premises liability, a defendant will 
only be found liable if the plaintiff can show: (1) that the defendant had a 
actions, or failure to take action, resulted in his or her injuries or damages. 
decision to forego certain protective or remedial measures were the 
proximate cause of his or her injuries or damages.151 The same duty should 
 
145 Id. at 625. 
146 Id. at 626. ( [T]he test is too broad and imposes an unqualified duty to protect 
customers in areas experiencing any significant level of criminal activity.  Additionally, 
the test has been considered and found to be too broad and unpredictable, effectively . . . 
requiring landowners [to] anticipate crime. ). 
147 Id. at 627. 
148 Id. ( [T]he degree of foreseeability needed to establish a duty decreases in proportion 
to the magnitude of the foreseeable harm  and the burden upon defendant to engage in 
alternative conduct. ). 
149 Id. at 629. (This approach has been compared to the Hand Formula  which 
essentially defines negligence as the unreasonable balancing of the cost of safety measures 
against the risk of accidents. ). 
150 Robert W. Foster, et al., Balancing Act: Does a South Carolina Property Owner Have 
a Duty to Protect its Invitees from Third-Party Crime?, NELSON MULLINS, 27 (2011), 
https://www.nelsonmullins.com/storage/33daeb28a85b7e2722c9ac2cc23c301b.pdf. 
151 Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 459 (N.Y. 1980) ( [T]he fact that 
the instrumentality  which produced the injury was the criminal conduct of a third person 
would not preclude a finding of proximate cause  if the intervening agency was itself a 
foreseeable hazard ). 
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be extended to website operators in the online context. As previously 
mentioned, this duty would not require online service providers to protect 
against any and all harm, but only against conduct that is foreseeably likely 
to result in harm152 This theory would hold online operators responsible 
for the decisions made in respect to their website, and thus, incentivize 
conduct. 
IV. PREMISES LIABILITY IN THE ONLINE CONTEXT 
As previously mentioned, a premises owner or operator is not always 
liable for conduct of a third party.153 However, the duty under the theory 
of premises liability extends to landowners when the potential harm from 
third-party conduct is reasonably foreseeable.154 This note focuses on the 
duty that should be extended to online service providers and the causation 
requirement that must be established for a successful premises liability 
claim in the online context. 
It is first important to note and distinguish the reasonable content 
moderation approach proposed by Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin 
Wittes in 2018 from what is being suggested here.155 The interpretive shift 
proposed by Citron and Wittes is similar to the approach outlined in this 
note. First, as stated by Citron and Wittes, courts should not apply Section 
publication of 
third-party content.156 Essentially, courts should only extend Section 230 
immunity to platforms when the plaintiffs in those cases attempt to hold 
-party content.157 Second, 
Citron and Wittes argue that courts should limit Section 230 immunity to 
158 
 
152 See Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1584 (2005) ( A court using [the balancing 
test] would look at all relevant circumstances, including the number, nature, and location 
of prior similar computer crimes and the closeness of the connection between defective 
software and the intrusions. ). 
153 Clarkson, supra note 112 at 619. 
154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f. (1965) ( If the place or character of 
his business, or his past experience, is such that [a possessor of land] should reasonably 
anticipate carless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at 
some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it . . . ). 
155 Citron & Wittes, supra note 14 at 456. 
156 Id. at 467. 
157 Id. at 468. 
158 Id. 
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activity or that proactively address[es] illegal material . . . but end[s] up 
under-screenin 159 
The premises liability analysis proposed in this note ultimately aims 
reasonable content 
moderation proposal.160 However, analysis under the theory of premises 
liability is an application of a distinct theoretical framework based on 
classical tort principles. Under a theory of premises liability, courts can 
adhere to the distinction between a publisher and another tortfeasor
principally, a landowner who failed to take reasonable precautionary 
measures in light of potential harm. 
This section will apply premises liability concepts to the cases of 
Herrick v. Grindr and Daniel v. Armslist, the plaintiffs in which both 
petitioned, unsuccessfully, the U.S. Supreme Court for review in 2019. 
Before applying the theory of premises liability to those cases, this section 
and reasoning. 
A. Summary of Herrick v. Grindr161 
design, promissory estoppel, fraud, and copyright infringement.162 Herrick 
is a former user of the Defe
Defendant is characterized as an internet service provider under Section 
230. Grindr maintained a dating application for gay and bi-sexual 
sub
application.163 
Like other dating apps, Grindr requires users to set up a profile by 
name, photographs, and information about themselves.164 Grindr then uses 
matching.165 Once two users have matched they can send each other 
 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 467-68. 
161 See Carrie Goldberg, Herrick v. Grindr: Why Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act Must Be Fixed, LAWFARE (Aug 14, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/herrick-v-grindr-why-section-230-communications-
decency-act-must-be-fixed. 
162 Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
163 Id. at 584. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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messages and share location data with each other.166 Matthew Herrick and 
his ex-boyfriend matched on Grindr and began an exclusive relationship 
in 2015, upon which Herrick deleted the application.167 
-boyfriend used Grindr to 
impersonate Herrick by posting fake profiles stating that Herrick was 
interested in rough sexual encounters, including rape fantasies and 
bondage.168 
the profiles impersonating him, Grindr failed to substantively respond.169 
As a result, hundreds of Grindr users who matched with the impostor 
profiles of Herrick sought him out approximately 1,100 users.170 
ex-boyfriend to harass and harm Herrick.171  
would resist their approach, which they were told was part of a rape-
172 
continued harassment he experienced.173 Herrick alleged that Grindr failed 
174 
recognition or duplicate- move 
impersonating profiles.175 
Moreover, Grindr neither uses keyword search functions in its direct 
addresses, MAC addresses, and ICC numbers or block the use of spoofing, 
proxies, and vir
implemented.176 
allowed Grindr to discover whether an account was associated with 
- 177 Herrick also argued that 
Grindr had sufficient notice of the misuse, and potential future misuse, 
occurring on its application because he had filed multiple reports regarding 
the accounts, and still failed to warn users.178 Despite this knowledge, 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 584-85. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 585. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 




176 Id. at 585. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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Grindr led users to believe that it had security measures in place to prevent 
harassment and that it valued the safety of its users.179 Grindr designed its 
ons to prevent, or 
rectify, potentially dangerous conditions.180 This made it possible for 
-
conduct through the Grindr app. 
Grindr successfully sought to cloak itself with the broad immunity 
consistently granted by courts under Section 230 of the CDA. Grindr 
argued that holding it responsible for failing to remove or block the 
impersonating profiles would be to find it responsible for acting as a 
publisher of third-party content, as prohibited by Section 230.181 The 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Grindr was 
dismiss.182 
role in editing or removing offensive content precisely the role for which 
183 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision,184 echoing  the District Court 
Grindr liable for its failure to combat or remove offensive third-party 
content, and are barred by § 185 In his last hopeful effort, Matthew 
Herrick petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of 
certiorari.186 
2019.187 
Cases challenging the application of Sec
provision, like Herrick v. Grindr, are frequently dismissed prior to the 
discovery phase. In approximately 92% of cases where the Section 230 
immunity defense is advanced, the courts will address it (and oftentimes 
 
179 Id. at 586. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 587. 
182 See id. 
183 Id. at 588. 
184 See Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 765 Fed.Appx. 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2019). 
185 Id. at 590; see Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(claims based on the structure and operation  of a defendant ICS were barred by § 230 
because the lack of safety features reflects choices about what content can appear on the 
website and in what form,  which are editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions ). 
186 See Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 765 F. App x 586 (2d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. Aug. 7, 2019) (No. 19-192). 
187 Order Denying the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 140 S. Ct. 221 (2019). 
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dismiss the cases) prior to discovery.188 The decision to forgo discovery 
not only prevents plaintiffs from bringing their legitimate claims against 
online operators and learning of their content moderation practices, but it 
also prevents online service providers from improving their operations by 
learning of the potentially dangerous features on their platform. As such, 
online operators are not incentivized or given the opportunity to discover 
new technologies or techniques that could increase user safety, and thus, 
promote growth. For example, female users may be more inclined to use 
a social media platform or dating application, if they believe that the online 
service provider is engaging in reasonable content moderation that 
protects users from fake accounts or threats. Discovery of reasonable 
content moderation will expand the marketplace of ideas by encouraging 
users, primarily minorities, to engage on those platforms implementing 
those practices. 
promoting 
a free marketplace of ideas because it discourages individuals from 
speaking out of fear of harassment. Interactive computer service providers 
are granted total immunity without even the threat of potential discovery 
that could reveal an unreasonable lack of safety measures.189 Just as 
landowners or businesses are encouraged to discover adopt safety features 
in physical spaces, especially after harmful incidents, so could the owners 
and operators of the online spaces.190 Without access to discovery, 
plaintiffs are excluded from the opportunity of arguing that the online 
 
188 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 373, 483 (2010) ( A court refused to address the defendant s section 230 
defense prior to discovery in only 7.6% of the decisions. ). 
189 Carrie Goldberg, Herrick v. Grindr: Why Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act Must be Fixed, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/herrick-v-grindr-why-
section-230-communications-decency-act-must-be-fixed (August 14, 2019) ( There are, or 
should be, fact-intensive inquiries, but if cases are dismissed on motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, as ours was before discovery and without defendants even 
needing to plead Section 230 immunity plaintiffs will never have a chance. ). 
190 See Citron & Wittes, supra note 45 at 403 ( In physical space, a business that arranged 
private rooms for strangers to meet, knowing that sexual predators were using its services 
to meet kids would have to do a great deal more than warn people to proceed at their own 
peril  to avoid liability when bad things happened (referring to Omegle.com). A physical 
magazine devoted to publishing user-submitted malicious gossip about nonpublic figures 
would face a blizzard of lawsuits as false and privacy-invading materials harmed people s 
lives. And a company that knowingly allowed designated foreign terrorist groups to use 
their physical services would face all sorts of lawsuits from victims of terrorist attacks. 
Something is out of whack and requires rethinking when such activities are 
categorically immunized from liability merely because they happen online. ). 
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practices, those that are reasonable in light of the foreseeable harm. 
B. Summary of Daniel v. Armslist 
actions on behalf of herself and her deceased mother, Zina Daniel 
.191 
in front of her daughter.192 Armslist is characterized as an interactive 
computer service provider under Section 230. Armslist is an online 
marketplace that facilitates firearm transactions by third-party buyers and 
sellers.193 Houghton utilized Armslist.com to illegally purchase the 
194 
In October 2012, a Wisconsin court granted Zina a restraining order 
against her husband, Haughton, after a domestic violence dispute.195 The 
terms of the order prohibited Haughton from possessing a firearm.196 
Nevertheless, Haughton visited Armslist.com and arranged the purchase 
of a semiautomatic handgun from a third party.197 On October 21st, a day 
after acquiring the firearm, Haughton went to the salon where Zina 
worked, killed three people, injured four others, and then shot himself.198 
Daniel was in the salon at the time of the shooting and witnessed the tragic 
events described.199 Daniel brought several tort claims against Armslist, 
alleging that Armslist facilitated the illegal purchase of a firearm that 
Houghton would have otherwise had difficulty obtaining.200 In facilitating 
 
website, Armslist.com, to purchase the firearm used in the brutal event 
resulting in this case.201 Armslist utilized several design features that made 
it easy for individuals prohibited from purchasing, carrying, or using 
firearms to acquire one anyway. Armslist did not require purchasers or 
 
191 Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis.2d 449, 449 (Wis. 2019). 
192 Id. at 459. 
193 Id. at 457. 
194 Id. at 458. 
195 Id. at 458-59. 




200 Id. at 449. 
201 Id. at 460. 
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sellers to register accounts and allowed them to maintain anonymity.202 
restrictions, as the case at hand, not only to illegally purchase a firearm, 
but to avoid requirements like state-mandated waiting periods.203 
Furthermore, Armslist allowed potential purchasers to filter private 
sellers from federally licensed gun dealers.204 This further simplified 
illegal firearm sales because private sellers are not required to conduct 
background checks that could reveal possible reasons for preventing a 
particular sale.205 Although Armslist did in fact have a flagging component 
on its website, which is generally a positive step for website operators in 
restricting harmful conduct, the feature did not apply to illegal conduct but 
those similar in nature.206 As such, Armslist gave a simple means for 
purchasing firearms to those whom access was intended to be most 
restricted. 
that Armslist knew or should have known that its website would put 
firearms in the hands of dangerous, prohibited purchasers, and that 
Armslist specifically designed its website to facilitate illegal 
207 Daniel argued that her suit did not seek to treat Armslist 
its website, [which] helped to develop the content of the firearm 
208 
encouragement of illegal firearm sale
specifically posted by the third-party seller.209 Armslist countered that it 
was immune as an interactive computer service provider under Section 
230.210 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the Material 
Contribution Test to determine whether a computer service provider is 
immune from liability.211 The Material Contribution Test is one method of 
analysis used to aid courts in determining when an interactive computer 
service provider is acting as an information content provider.212 The Test 





205 Id. at 475. 
206 Id. at 460. 
207 Id. at 461. 
208 Id. at 466. 
209 Id. at 466-67. 
210 Id. at 467. 
211 Id. at 468. 
212 See id. at 467-68 (discussing why courts use the material contribution  test). 
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conduct, the website can be seen as a developer of that content.213 
However, a site cannot be liable for merely displaying the allegedly illegal 
conduct.214 
to determine whether the design features were a material contribution to 
the illegal conduct or content.215 
ext is a feature provided by an interactive 
216 In Roommates.com, 
217 ]f a 
immunizes the website operator from liability when third parties use them 
218 
of the CDA barred her claims.219 The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
designed its website to allow illegal sales of firearms, it was a creator of 
content rather than a mere intermediary.220 On appeal, the Wisconsin 
-
publisher of third-party cont
third-party content available, knowledge that the site could be used for 
illegal purposes was, therefore, considered irrelevant.221 That Court stated 
222 Ultimately, the 
determinations and reversed the Appellate decision.223 The Supreme Court 
of the United States denied review on November 25, 2019.224 
 
213 Id. at 468-69. 
214 Id. at 469. 
215 Id. at 472. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 474. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 461-462. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 475. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 463. 
224 U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 19-153. 
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C. The Duty of Online Service Providers 
The Second and Third Restatements of Torts provide guidelines for 
determining whether a duty should be extended to landowners. A 
landowner whose conduct did not create the risk of harm generally does 
not have a duty of care, unless the court determines an affirmative duty 
exists by statute, prior conduct, special relationship, or undertaking.225 
However, pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343: A landowner 
conditions the landowner knew or should have discovered through the 
 
which the landowner failed to protect against.226 In other words, in the 
online context, if the risk of harm from certain features on the website 
outweighs the burden of the provider in imposing available protective 
measures, the online service provider should be extended a duty to provide 
such, and be responsible for those decisions. 
A duty to exercise reasonable care to protect users and others from 
dangerous conduct by third parties should not be limited to physical land 
operators, but should be extended 
intended to promote the values of privacy, security and liberty alongside 
227 The proposed duty would incentivize 
privacy, security, liberty, and free speech rights thus adhering to 
228 An online service provider, 
like a land operator, is in the best position to protect against conditions that 
create an unreasonable risk of harm that they know about or could discover 
through the exercise of reasonable care. The decision of whether that duty 
has been breached turns on the foreseeability of the harm.229 
help determine whether the provider knew, or should have known, that 
 
225 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 37-44 (AM. L. INST. 1995). 
226 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
227 Citron & Franks, supra note 22 at 45, 51 (2020) (citing to Mary Anne Franks, The 
Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Feb. 17, 2014). 
228 See Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect Consumers: Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection and Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Danielle Keats Citron, 
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law) ( Online behavioral advertising 
generates profits by turning users into products, their activity into assets,  and their 
platforms into weapons of mass manipulation.  Tech companies have few incentives to 
stop [online abuse], and in some cases are incentivized to ignore or aggravate [it]. ); 
Citron & Franks, supra note 22 at 45, 51. 
229 See Martin v. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., 2013 PA Super 299, 80 A.3d 813, 815 
(2013). 
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harm was reasonably likely to occur. In the online context, numerous 
websites have enacted features that allow them to be notified by users for 
objectionable content.230 However, many of these websites have failed to 
adequately equip themselves to address these numerous user 
notifications.231 Note that, as discussed above, willful ignorance does not 
preclude liability and is not considered a valid excuse in law.  There are 
several features that could be used to more adequately address dangerous 
content or conduct occurring on online platforms.232 
Given the number of notifications that the defendant, Grindr, received 
from Herrick in Herrick v. Grindr and the dangerous nature of conduct 
occurring through the website in Daniel v. Armslist, the defendants in these 
cases knew, or had reason to know, that harm was foreseeable.233 
Moreover, the defendants were in the best position to protect against and 




Once having been notified of the potential danger from the impersonating 
profiles, Grindr could have easily used one of the aforementioned 
programs to combat the dangerous condition. 
Grindr should have had a duty to protect its users by discovering 
inherently dangerous conditions facilitated by its failure to use the 
aforementioned features. Grindr knew of the potential harm to Herrick by 
the profiles and could have implemented geofencing235 to discover 
without significantly burdening itself. Instead, Grindr did nothing.236 
 
230 See generally Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Jane Doe No. 
1 v. Backpage.com LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 12 (1st Cir. 2016); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. 
Supp. 3d 579, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Daniel v, Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 449 (Wis. 
2019). 
231 See Shelley Ross Saxer, Am I My Brother s Keeper? : Requiring Landowner 
Disclosure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV. 
522, 531 (2001) ( [F]oreseeability was based upon the magnitude of the risk and the fact 
that this concern had already been brought to the landlord s attention by other tenants in 
the building. ). 
232 See Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (describing the features available 
to Grindr for addressing multiple profiles). 
233 See id. at 593 ( Grindr ignored numerous complaints and requests for [it] to control 
its product and disable the [impersonating] accounts being used to destroy [Herrick s] 
life. ). 
234 Id. at 585. 
235 Id. 
236 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, No. 19-192 (U.S. S. Ct. dismissed 
on Oct. 7, 2019) ( Grindr was the only one that could help, was on repeated notice, and 
was uniquely and exclusively qualified to do so. Yet, Grindr did nothing. ). 
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Furthermore, in an effort to prevent the creation of duplicate profiles, 
237 
he 
available features could have prevented or remediated the dangerous 
 
Similarly, in Daniel v. Armslist, Armslist knew or had reason to know 
that the feature allowing the anonymous purchase of firearms238 could 
foreseeably result in harm. Anonymity in transactions involving firearms 
is inherently dangerous because sellers are unable to identify the 
purchase a firearm.239 In deciding to implement this anonymity feature, 
Armslist chose to accept the potential risk of harm. Under the proposed 
duty, Armslist would not be required to change its operations if it finds its 
interests are better served by allowing such risky activity meaning that 
it would be more cost effective to implement reasonable content 
moderation to avoid liability than not and risk being held liable. However, 
Armslist would be required to pay for the consequences facilitated by such 
a feature, or lack thereof. In applying the balancing approach for extending 
a duty, a court should have found that due to the available remedial or 
protective features, other than the removal of anonymity, the safety rights 
ests. 
This duty fits within the original purpose of Section 230 because it does 
not force Armslist to undertake any particular course of action, but rather, 
only prevents it from merely sitting back and watching dangerous 
conditions manifest harm without taking responsibility for the 
consequences its design choices facilitated. The proposed duty requires 
that which 
is reasonable in light of foreseeable harm to discover and implement 
content moderation measures.240 
 
237 Id. 
238 See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 460 (Wis. 2019). 
239 Internet Firearm Sales: ATF Enforcement Efforts and Outcomes of GAO Covert 
Testing (Dec. 21, 2017) ( In 2016, the Center also issued a report about Internet firearm 
transactions. This and other ATF reports highlighted the following about Internet-
facilitated firearm transactions: The relative anonymity of the Internet makes it an ideal 
means for prohibited individuals to obtain illegal firearms; The more anonymity employed 
by a firearms purchaser, the greater the likelihood that the transaction violates federal law; 
Firearm transactions that occur on the Dark Web are more likely to be completed in person 
or via the mail or common carrier, versus through a Federal Firearm Licensee. ). 
240 See Kim, supra note 20 at 1042 ( The intent underlying Section 230 immunity, at 
least as interpreted by courts, is to both permit Web site sponsors to monitor content and 
relieve them of the burden of doing so. ). 
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Despite these useful features, it is highly probable that new loopholes 
or workarounds will continuously be created, thus making it difficult to 
always protect against all potentially dangerous content. However, a duty 
that requires online service providers to monitor these changes 
periodically and keep their protective measures relatively up to date, 
similar to that proposed in Citron and Wittes reasonable content 
moderation proposal, should be extended to online service providers as 
is currently required of landowners under the theory of premises liability. 
Premises liability using the balancing test does not require landowners to 
always be up to date. Rather, it requires landowners to make concerted 
efforts to weigh their economic inter 241 This 
duty would force online service providers to choose user safety when the 
risk of harm outweighs the burden or cost of imposing such a measure. 
Similarly, in premises liability, landowners are forced to implement 
protective or remedial measures when the risk of injury outweighs the cost 
of such an implementation.242 Consider that if Grindr used a duplicate-
detection software and geolocation feature to prohibit the creation of 
multiple profiles, imposters could have moved to the use of a virtual 
private network. In exercising reasonable care, Grindr would have 
discovered that features allowing it to search IP and MAC address search, 
as well as block the use of spoofing, proxies, and virtual private networks 
(VPNs), would have allowed Grindr to prohibit the creation of new 
impersonating accounts and locate the imposter.243 Grindr would have a 
duty to decide which safety measures are necessary and would be 
responsible for those decisions. 
Physical businesses that create conditions that make criminal activity 
more likely to occur have been held liable for such conduct.244 For 
example, a hotel that has no night security and minimal lighting in the 
parking lot may be held liable for the criminal activity that takes place on 
the premises. Such conditions facilitate criminal activity, or at a minimum, 
make it easier or more likely for it to occur than if security measures had 
been implemented. Similarly, certain features on a website created by the 
online service providers facilitate criminal conduct. In Daniel v. Armslist, 
the ability for unlicensed sellers, who do not require background checks, 
 
241 Clarkson, supra note 112 at 629. 
242 See id. at 628. 
243 Id. 
244 Landlord s Liability for Failure to Protect Tenant from Criminal Acts of Third 
Person, 43 A.L.R.5TH 207 (1996) (referring to § 4[b] Duty to Protect Against Reasonably 
Foreseeable Criminal Acts of Third Parties Where Based on Physical Defect of 
Premises). 
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to sell dangerous weapons to nearly anyone245  - facilitated or made 
criminal conduct more likely to occur.246, Thus, these features provided a 
simple means for those with restricted access to firearms to obtain them. 
The question for determining whether a duty should be extended in 
the online context is whether online service providers can continue to 
operate their businesses in a safer manner with different features.247 Could 
Grindr have continued to operate successfully if it blocked the use of 
VPNs and used common-image recognition or duplicate-detection 
software? Could Armslist have continued its operation if it removed the 
anonymity feature or required purchasers from private sellers to reveal 
their identity? The answer would likely be yes there were available 
measures that Grindr and Armslist could have taken that would not have 
severely burdened their operations. Nonetheless, they chose to operate 
their business in the manner described above and as such should be 
responsible for the consequences. 
In summary, under traditional premises liability analysis, a landowner 
may be found liable for a dangerous condition present on his or her 
property, if he or she knew or should have known of the condition and 
failed to implement reasonable measures to protect against or remediate it 
before it caused an injury.248 Dangerous design features in the online 
context fit within the premises liability framework.249 If a website feature 
creates the risk of harm, and the operator knows or should know of this 
injury occurs, the website operator should be found liable, not be extended 
immunity. 
Due to the newness and continuous expansion of the internet, new 
measures and loopholes around such will continuously present 
themselves. Nevertheless, online service providers should have a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in protecting against dangerous third-party 
conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of harm through the use of their 
services. The duty proposed does not require online service providers to 
provide a perfectly safe internet space, but requires operators to balance 
the interests in deciding what reasonable features, measures, or policies to 
 
245 Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 449 (Wis. 2019). 
246 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344. cmt. f. (AM. L. INST. 1995). 
247 Scott W. Weatherford, Comment, The Ad Hoc Duty: A Landowner s Duty to Protect 
After Del Lago Partners v. Smith, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 565, 568 (2011) (quoting Gen. 
Electric Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 216-18 (Tex. 2008)). 
248 See Steven D. Winegar, Comment, Reapportioning the Burden of Uncertainty: 
Storekeeper Liability in the Self-Service Slip-and-Fall Case, 41 UCLA L. REV. 861, 866 
(1994). 
249 See Citron & Wittes, supra note 14 at 468 ( Designing a site to enable defamation or 
sex trafficking could result in liability in the absence of a finding that a site was being sued 
for publishing or speaking. ). 
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implement to prevent foreseeable harm. The duty proposed is consistent 
 that is, reasonable and 
directed at foreseeable harm- moderation practices. This duty requires 
who fail to moderate content at all, even when it is likely to cause harm. 
D. Causation 
For the causation element to be satisfied, a plaintiff must show but-for 
causation and proximate causation.250 -for 
reasonable care in protecting and remedying a dangerous condition was 
a sub
not have resulted but- 251 Proximate cause turns 
on the foreseeability of the harm whether the consequences were the 
ct, or lack thereof.252 
-for cause, 
the court should ask whether the criminal activity or intentional tort would 
have been carried out through the means used had other available and safer 
features been implemented. In the context of criminal attacks, the question 
becomes difficult to answer because it is hard to pinpoint exactly what 
measures would have prevented or stopped a criminal attack.253 In the 
online context, where individuals are able to remain anonymous and 
hidden behind the screen of an electronic device, the only thing likely to 
prevent criminal or intentionally tortious content online are those features 
implemented by the platforms themselves. This is evident through the use 
example, in Grindr, -boyfriend may have been deterred from 
making multiple impersonating profiles if Grindr had implemented and 
enforced policies that prohibited such. 
The features on Grindr
a substantial causal factor is not sufficient to qualify as being the but-for 
cause, the other possible causal factors must be insignificant or removed 
from the event.254 -
boyfriend would not have been able to send numerous individuals in 
 
250 Holmes v. Campbell Properties, Inc., 47 So.3d 721, 724 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). 
251 Id. at 724-25. 
252 Id. at 724. 
253 See Mark Geistfeld, Tort Law and Criminal Behavior (Guns), 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 
316-17 (2001). 
254 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (comment on what 
constitutes legal cause). 
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this point it is important to -boyfriend attempted to 
commit the same scheme on other applications that once having been 
notified, rectified the dangerous condition in a timely manner.255 
Therefore, but- or failure to implement good 
faith content moderation practices that would allow it to operate in a 
reasonably safe condition in light of foreseeable harm, like the other 
applications
causing him to be harassed and harmed. In Daniel v. Armslist, Houghton 
would have found it more difficult to obtain a firearm given the restraining 
order filed against him. However, because of the design features created 
by Armslist.com, Houghton was able to easily obtain the firearm without 
a trace and commit 
the reason why Houghton was able to go onto the site and easily obtain a 
firearm. Although it is possible that Houghton could have done this offline, 
he would not have been able to maintain anonymity and he would have 
negligent design features were the but-
because the other potential causal factors are insignificant. 
The inquiry for determining proximate cause is one of 
foreseeability.256 Foreseeability is involved in both determining whether a 
proximate cause. However, courts analyze foreseeability for duty and 
foreseeability for proximate causation separately they are two distinct 
and independent elements.257 The foreseeability analysis for determining 
whether there is a duty is a broader more general inquiry compared to the 
fact-specific analysis required for the determination of proximate cause.258 
A court examining duty does not look specifically to the conduct or 
characteristics of the defendant, but rather on the general event.259 On the 
other hand, the causation inquiry is fact specific whether the specific 
behavior by that specific defendant could foreseeably lead to injury.260 
Thus, courts decide whether proximate cause exists on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
255 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, No. 19-192 (2019). 
256 See Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 325 (Ind. 2016). 
257 Michael Campbell, Comment, Ballpark Beatdowns: A New Framework to Protect 
Fans, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 109, 124 (2012). 
258 Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
259 See Cody J. Jacobs, Guns in the Private Square, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1097, 1113 
(2020). 
260 Id. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 91 
 
In the online context, courts should consider several factors in their 
proximate cause analysis.261 In premises liability, courts take into account 
factors that could have prevented the injury for example, the policies in 
place at the premises and the characteristics of the perpetrator of the crime 
or intentional tort. Similarly, these factors should be used in the proximate 
cause analysis in the online context. In applying the theory of premises 
liability to the online context, courts should consider whether the 
been prevented had the online service provider implemented other 
available protective or remedial features or more stringent policies. 
Courts should account for several factors in determining whether 
proximate causation exists. In the cases of Grindr and Armslist, courts 
should consider whether the defendants were notified, the number of users, 
and available preventative features, just to name a few. For example, 
that Grindr was a larger platform.262 Additionally, in the case of Armslist, 
courts should consider the inherently dangerous content allowed by the 
website to determine the foreseeability of harm. The online service 
providers in Grindr and Armslist are distinct and thus, the factors to be 
analyzed differ and would be weighed differently. Accordingly, the 
determination is fact specific. 
In both Herrick v. Grindr and Daniel v. Armslist, the defendants were 
notified numerous times of the dangerous condition and chose to ignore 
the risk. Once having been notified, they should have had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in protecting against the potential harm. Under 
the theory of premises liability, a store that is notified of a wet floor has a 
duty to address the risk to protect against the potential harm. In that case, 
the store could clean up the mess or place a sign to warn customers. If the 
Similarly, online service providers that ignore the dangerous conditions on 
the websites they created and that are under their operation and control are 
the proximate cause of the harm from those conditions. The fact that the 
spill, in the case of a physical premises, or attacks, in the cases of Grindr 
 
261 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1553, 1585 (2005) ( Courts should examine factors 
such as: (1) whether there have been prior similar cybercrimes; (2) the cost of increased 
internet security measures; and (3) the degree to which intermediaries can reduce the radius 
of the cybercrime problem. ). 
262 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Herrick v. Grindr LLC, No. 19-192 (U.S. S. Ct. dismissed on 
Oct. 7, 2019). 
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and Armslist, were ultimately completed by third parties does not break 
the chain of causation. 
CONCLUSION 
A laudable goal of Section 230 is to encourage online service 
ntially dangerous 
content present on their platforms. The history of Section 230 illustrates 
how courts have made decisions that directly contradict this mission to 
incentivize online intermediaries. The theory of premises liability, based 
on traditional tort principles, should be applied to the online context. 
Extending a duty of care to online service providers, not being treated as 
publishers, will incentivize them to implement safety measures and to 
internalize the costs of their design decisions. Moreover, in looking at how 
causation has been found in premises liability cases, courts can apply the 
same concepts to online liability cases. Applying the theory of premises 
liability to the online context would make it possible to hold online service 
providers responsible for failing to moderate content it knows can 
foreseeably result in harm, thus encouraging them to make reasonable 
efforts to protect against such conditions while also adhering to the 
concept of immunity for acting solely as publishers. This is illustrated by 
the application of premises liability to the recent cases of Herrick v. Grindr 
and Daniel v. Armslist. Only when online service providers are treated like 
classic publishers can they be provided with the shield of Section 230 and 
only wh
harm should online service providers escape liability. 
